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Abstract 
Agricultural Protectionism in a Strategic 
Trade Policy Context: An Application to 
the US Cheese Market 
Using a general conjectural variations model, this paper shows that even though import 
tariffs may be justified where markets are imperfectly competitive, such a policy may be 
inferior to alternative forms of trade intervention. These results are evaluated in the context 
of the US cheese processing sector. 
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Introduction 
A significant and increasing proportion of international agricultural trade now occurs where 
markets are less than perfect, involving state marketing boards, multinational firms and firms 
involved in food processing (see McCalla, 1981, Handy and MacDonald and Elleson for 
discussion). However, despite this, there has only been a limited discussion by agricultural 
economists of the arguments put forward in the international economics literature which 
suggest that an active trade policy may be justified where markets are imperfectly 
competitive. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to assess the relevance of these theoretical 
developments for agricultural trade policy, with specific reference to processed food markets. 
The paper is outlined as follows: Section 1 briefly reviews the arguments for active 
trade policy where markets are imperfectly competitive. Section 2 compares two forms of 
intervention, an optimal tariff and a maximum import price. The application of the 
theoretical results to the US processed cheese sector is presented in Section 3 whilst Section 
4 provides a brief summary and conclusion. 
1. Trade Policy and Imperfect Competition 
The standard justification put forward for what is known as strategic trade policy is that of 
"rent-shifting" (see for example, Brander and Spencer, 1984, 1985, and Dixit, 1984 ). The 
basic idea is that a government can alter the nature of competition between firms for 
monopoly rents in imperfectly competitive markets. Hence, in a quantity-setting framework, 
tariffs and export subsidies can increase the welfare of importers and exporters 
respectivel/1). 
Whilst imperfect competition has been incorporated into agricultural trade analysism, 
strategic trade policy has largely been ignored, the principal exception to this being the 
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recent work of Thursby and Krishna and Thursby who have focussed on markets where state 
marketing boards are important participants in agricultural trade. This paper extends such 
analysis to trade in high-value food products which represent an increasingly important part 
of agricultural trade (Elleson). Importantly, in contrast to much of the literature which 
focusses on the effects of tariffs and quotas, this paper compares the welfare effects of a 
price control policy on imports with that of an optimal tariff. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical model used follows that of Dixit (1988) and is similar to Cheng. The 
essential features of it are: the use of a general conjectural variations approach, where the 
conjectural variations parameters are left free allowing different forms of oligopolistic 
behaviour; firms' costs are assumed to be constant; home produced goods (subscript 1) and 
imported goods (subscript 2) are treated as imperfect substitutes. 
Consumer surplus is given by: 
(1) 
where the utility function f(Q 1,Q2) is defined as: 
(2) 
From (1) and (2) the inverse demand functions for the home produced and imported goods 
can be derived: 
(3) 
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(4) 
where all parameters are positive, b1b2 - k2 > 0 since the products are imperfect substitutes, 
p1 and p2 are prices and Q1 and Q2 are quantities. 
On the supply side, there are ni firms in the home and foreign economies. Profits 
for a representative firm in each country are given by: 
(5) 
(6) 
where prices and quantities are as defined above, ci and fi are marginal and fixed costs 
respectively and t is a tariff imposed on imports. 
As noted earlier, the model is one where firms' reactions to one another are treated 
as a Nash equilibrium with conjectural variations. The conjectural variations parameters are 
derived from the first-order conditions of the respective profits functions: 
(7) 
(8) 
where dpjdqi is the conjectural variations parameter, i.e. the firm's expectation of how 
market prices will vary with changes in its output. Therefore, if a representative firm plays 
Cournot, it believes rival firms will not change output in response to a change in qi, hence 
dpj dqi = -bi, the slope of the inverse demand function. If the market were perfectly 
competitive, a change in one firm's output would have no effect on market price, 
i.e. dpj dqi = 0. 
Aggregating over the ni firms generates: 
(9) 
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(10) 
where Vi is the aggregate conjectural variations parameter. Thus, for Cournot behaviour, 
Vi = -bJni and as ni increases, the more competitive the Cournot outcome becomes. In the 
limit vi = 0, i.e. perfect competitionC3>. 
Equilibrium prices and quantities in the model are obtained by combining (3) and 
(4) with (9) and (10), the explicit solutions for quantities being: 
(11) 
The government's aim is to maximise domestic economic welfare which is defined as 
the sum of consumer surplus, domestic firms' profits and government revenue as given by: 
(12) 
which, substituting for r from (1), can be re-written as: 
(13) 
It is assumed that government intervention affects neither the demand parameters nor firms' 
conjectures. 
(a) Optimal Tariff Policy 
If a tariff is the main trade policy instrument available to the government, the optimal value 
for such a policy is derived by maximising (13) with respect to t. Using (2) and (10), the 
first-order condition for welfare maximisation is: 
(14) 
l>W V2(a2 - b2Q2 - kQI) + (P2 - C2) 
l>t (1 - V2 ) 
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As 0 1 and 0 2 are endogenous, (14) can be solved by substituting in (11) to give: 
(15) 
V1 b1 V1 k ~ V1 - 7(P1(~ - c1 ) - k(a1 - c1)] - A/(P1(a1 - c1) - k(~ - c1 )] + (p1 - c1 ) 
t- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Clearly the tariff is a function of the demand parameters, relative costs and the degree of 
imperfect competition. 
(b) Optimal Import Price Policy 
Most discussion of strategic trade policy has focussed on a comparison of the effects of 
tariffs and quotas. However, this paper considers an alternative policy instrument which 
involves the government choosing an import price that maximises domestic welfare, i.e. (13) 
is maximised with respect to p2• Using (2) and (10), the first-order condition is: 
(16) 
6W 
- - - (a- - b Q - kQ ) - (p - c )/ V. 6p2 -z l l 1 l 2 2 
Again, given that 0 1 and 0 2 are endogenous, (16) can be solved by substituting in (11) to 
give: 
(17) 
where p2 is the optimal import price which is a function of the demand parameters, relative 
costs and conjectural variations. In effect, it represents the maximum price at which 
imported goods can enter the domestic market. 
3. Trade Policies for the US Cheese Processing Sector 
These theoretical results can be evaluated empirically by usmg a computable partial 
equilibrium model originally suggested by Dixit (1987a). Since details of this model can be 
found elsewhere, the main details have been confined to an Appendix. The essence of this 
6 
technique, of which there are only a few examples, is to calibrate the model with data from 
external empirical sources such that the parameters of the demand system are consistent 
with equilibrium in a given period. 
Focussing on the US cheese processing sector, the effects of optimal trade policies 
can be examined. As there are a large number of varieties in this grouping, the analysis is 
confined to US imports of blue-vein cheese from the EC. This type of cheese was chosen 
for several reasons: first, it is a sector where there is a clear demand for government 
support, the US having protected it with import quotas since 1951 (see Hornig for a useful 
discussion); second, the US and EC cheese processing sectors are to varying degrees 
imperfectly competitive (see Hornig); third, blue-vein cheese is largely exported from the 
EC by private firms compared to other cheese varieties which tend to be exported by 
marketing boards and other organisations; and finally, most US imports of blue-vein cheese 
originate from the EC. 
Using price, quantity and elasticity data for blue-vein cheese, the model was 
calibrated for the years 1980 and 1985. Since import quotas currently affect the US cheese 
market, the model was initially used to simulate the effects on prices and quantities of 
liberalisation in the world dairy market, the estimated price changes being based on those 
of Tyers and Anderson. The model was then re-calibrated such that the parameters were 
consistent with these hypothetical free market values. Details of the data used are given in 
the Appendix. 
7 
Table 1 Optimal Tariffs and Maximum Import Prices ($/lb) 
Optimal Tariff 
Maximum Import Price 
1980 
0.12 
1.39 
1985 
0.16 
1.87 
Given the calibration, values for the optimal tariff and maximum import price were 
derived for 1980 and 1985, the values being shown in Table 1. In accordance with the 
theoretical analysis, there appears to be some justification for the use of a tariff on US 
imports from the EC given the structural characteristics of the two markets. For both 1980 
and 1985, the tariff represents 8 per cent of the original import price, whilst, in contrast, the 
maximum import price is 8 per cent less than the original import price. Essentially, since 
the exporter is assumed to have a price-cost markup (see Appendix), the optimal tariff is 
shifting rents from EC firms to the US economy. In the case of the maximum import price, 
the US government is forcing EC firms to forego their rents on exports by ensuring that the 
import price is equal to their costs of production, i.e. EC firms are being forced to play 
competitively. 
In' order to evaluate the effects of these policies on economic welfare, new 
equilibrium prices and quantities for the US cheese market were derived using (3), (4), (9) 
and (10), the welfare effects being described in Table 2. With reference to the optimal 
tariff, it is evident that this only marginally improves economic welfare in the US cheese 
sector in both periods. Relative to original levels of welfare, tariffs raise welfare by 0.2 and 
0.3 per cent in 1980 and 1985 respectively. Such small gains from tariffs are consistent with 
Dixit's (1987a) study of the US car market and Baldwin and Krugman's study of semi-
conductors. Therefore, the effect of optimal tariffs is largely distributional, consumers losing 
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from the policy whilst domestic firms' profits and government revenue increases. 
In contrast, the maximum import price appears to be a superior policy instrument, 
the gains in welfare being larger than those from the optimal tariff. For 1980 and 1985 
respectively, welfare increases by 2.6 percent and 3.2 per cent relative to original welfare 
levels. Again there are distributional effects, although in this case, the gains to consumers 
from lower priced imports outweigh the losses in domestic firms' profitsC4). 
Table 2 Welfare Effects of Optimal Trade Policies ($m) 
1980 1985 
Original Original 
Welfare t P2 Welfare t P2 
Consumer 26.50 25.87 27.38 32.96 31.97 34.26 
Surplus 
Domestic Firms' 4.39 4.42 4.32 5.27 5.36 5.18 
Profits 
Government 0.68 1.02 
Revenue 
Total Welfare 30.89 30.97 31.70 38.23 38.35 39.44 
The intuition as to why maximum import prices are superior is as follows: the 
optimal tariff restricts competition in the domestic market, the increase in firms' profits and 
government revenue (marginally) outweighing the losses to consumers; however, the 
maximum import price forces foreign firms to sell at prices near to cost which, in effect, 
imposes competitive discipline on domestic firms, and results in consumer gains outweighing 
the losses to domestic firms' profits. In general, the policy of setting a maximum import 
price raises a question against the standard strategic trade policy argument since it suggests 
that, under certain circumstances, making the market more competitive is better than 
making it less competitive. 
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4. Summary and Conclusion 
The theory of strategic trade policy suggests that there may be a normative justification for 
active trade policy where markets are imperfectly competitive. This may have important 
implications for agricultural trade where a growing proportion is conducted by state 
organisations, marketing boards and large-scale food processors. In this context, this paper 
has considered the welfare effects of implementing tariffs and maximum import prices for 
the US cheese processing sector with reference to imports from the EC. The rriain 
conclusions to be drawn from the analysis are that tariffs only marginally increase economic 
welfare, whilst the superior policy of a maximum import price would enhance competitive 
discipline in the market. 
Clearly there is considerable scope for further analysis of these arguments with 
respect to agricultural trade. First, the theoretical model needs to be extended to deal more 
explicitly with the characteristics of imperfectly competitive agricultural markets. Second, 
detailed empirical analysis is required to test these theories based on improved model 
specification, including the use of econometric models and better quality data. 
Notes 
1. Eaton and Grossman show that the choice of policy by the exporter is sensitive to 
whether the strategic variable of firms is price or quantity. In addition, further qualifications 
to the original analysis of Brander and Spencer have been made (see Dixit, 1987b, and 
Helpman and Krugman). 
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2. For example, the role of government interactions in trade has been discussed by McCalla 
(1966) and Schmitz et al. amongst others and the presence of intermediaries such as 
marketing boards has been highlighted by Just et al. and Markusen. 
3. The Vi can be calculated for a particular market equilibrium given data on prices, 
quantities and costs. 
4. It may be argued that these results will be sensitive to the data used to calibrate the 
model. In order to test this, a lower value for the elasticity of demand and a higher value 
for the elasticity of substitution between home and imported goods were chosen. Apart 
from slight changes in the magnitude of welfare values, the overall conclusions of the main 
results hold; optimal tariffs only increase welfare marginally, their main impact being 
distributional, whilst maximum import prices are a superior means of enhancing welfare. 
Appendix 
In order to derive the optimal trade policies and simulate their effects, it is necessary to 
have estimates of the parameters in the demand system. This is done by taking some of the 
parameter estimates from external empirical sources. The remainder are calculated by 
calibrating the theoretical model such that the parameters are consistent with equilibrium 
in the market in a given period. Focussing on the demand functions (Al) and (A2), there 
are five unknown parameters, A1, A2, B1, B2 and K. Since actual prices and quantities give 
two relations between them, three further relations are required to solve the system. 
(Al) 
(A2) 
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Following Dixit (1987a), expressions for the price elasticity of demand and elasticity 
of substitution can be derived and then set equal to empirically observed values. In the case 
of the price elasticity of demand, since the products of the dominaD:t firms and importers 
are being treated as imperfect substitutes, it is interpreted as being the effect of an 
equiproportionate rise in the price of the two products on total expenditure Q. Therefore, 
letting p1 = P1°P and p2 = P2°P, where P1° and P2° are initial prices and P is the 
proportional change factor, aggregate expenditure can be written as: 
(A3) 
Given that in the calibration p1 and p2 are the initial prices, and substituting 
equations (1) and (2) into (A3), the aggregate expenditure index can be re-written as: 
(A4) 
The total market elasticity of demand e, is then defined and evaluated at the initial 
point where the proportional change factor P equals one. By differentiating (A2) with 
respect to P, and multiplying by P /Q, the elasticity is given as: 
(AS) 
The elasticity of substitution would normally be defined as: 
(A6) 
12 
which gives a fourth relation between the parameters when set equal to the observed value 
for a. However, as Dixit (1987a) notes, (Al) and (A2) in general define the ratio Oi/02 
as a function of the vector (p1,p2) and not in terms of the ratio pifp2• In order for Oi/02 
to be a function of ptf p2, at least locally, then the parameters must satisfy the following 
relation: 
(A7) 
which implies homotheticity of the utility function. Given the definition of a in (A6) and 
using (Al), (A2) and (A7), the final expression for the elasticity of substitution can be 
derived as: 
(AS) 
Given this procedure, the model was calibrated for the years 1980 and 1985. Price 
and quantity data were derived from USDA Dairy Market Statistics, USDA Dairy Products 
and USDA Foriegn Agricultural Trade. The value of e for blue-vein cheese was derived 
from Anderson. No US estimate exists for a, so a value of 1.6 was used based on an 
Australian estimate made by Higgs. It should be noted that sensitivity analysis was 
conducted with different values of the elasticity parameters (see note 4). No precise data 
for costs were available, consequently, costs for both the US and EC were assumed to be 
8 per cent below wholesale prices which accords with the level of the price-cost mark-up 
reported by Hornig. 
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